tor
The second-generation onion router
see also :
torify
Synopsis
tor
[OPTION value]...
add an example, a script, a trick and tips
examples
source
function tor {
apt-get install -y tor
}
source
How to "flush tor circuit"
If you use the Vidalia GUI, you can use the Network map to close
all circuits. It's not as fast, but does the same thing.
source
How can I install tor in the UAE?
If this doesn't work try these. I personally would go
with the browser bundle. Note: the instructions on these pages
are just copies of the ones found on the main site, however many
them have separate repo addresses.
#
https://www.torservers.net/mirrors/torproject.org/
#
https://www.oignon.net/
#
https://www.torproject.us/
#
https://tor.beme-it.de/
#
https://torproj.xpdm.us/
#
https://tor.blingblingsquad.net/
#
https://tor.tomyn.com/
#
https://tor-www.5coluna.com/
#
http://jan25.virtadpt.net/
If all else fails send an empty email (from gmail only) with the
subject HELP to gettor AT torproject.org
source
Secure linux distro that sends traffic through Tor
Use quantOS. It routes all traffic though Tor, and is
generally hardened, but I do not know if you can make it live.
source
Forcing Tor to use a given IP address for outbound connections
After looking around I found:
OutboundBindAddress B
Explanation
Note OutboundBindAddress. This is the IP Tor-users will be
exiting your server from. This setting should also be set to your
servers IP if it has a real IP (not behind a NAT firewall with
something like 192.168.1.2), even if it only has one, because
then anyone exiting from your server to your server will then be
coming from that IP and not from 127.0.0.1 (which they would if
OutboundBindAddress is not set).
source
SSH Tunnel with socat and tor
Try to use torsocks instead of socat. Torsocks based on tsocks
proxifier for Tor:
# dpkg -l torsocks
ii torsocks 1.2-3 amd64 use SOCKS-friendly applications with Tor
# torsocks ssh user@server
#Enter a password
# Welcome !
shell:~/$ who
me pts/16 2013-08-31 22:41 (tor2.tedesca.net)
I'm from: tor2.tedesca.net
source
Multiple identities at the same time using TOR?
I'm not entirely sure what you mean by identities, and sending a
packet to change it.
Using threads means sharing memory space, so if you want to
change a variable in your application only for a specific thread,
you need to make a separate variable for your thread, or other
identity. Otherwise you could change your application to fork a
separate process for each identity you use and achieve a similar
effect.
source
How to use Wget with Tor Bundle in Linux
Maybe www.whatismyip.com is checking X-Forwarded-For header and trigger an error.
I recommend you to test another one (this is my own, so I know
there's no detections of any kind, just your public address) :
http://sputnick-area.net/ip
Edit: I think you should remove
-proxy
switch while it's not in man
wget
. IIRC, wget can detect the proxy itself. :
wget -q -O - www.whatismyip.com
source
How do you set up TOR in Ubuntu Linux?
You should reconsider what you are trying to accomplish.
"I'm trying to install VPN or TOR" rings a lot of alarm bells;
they are very different things.
TOR provides anonymity providing you do not enter
peronsally-identifiable information whilst using it. Be aware
that the last node on your connection can read all your traffic
data, and that anyone can run such nodes!
Propper SSH VPN tunnesl however provide truely secure
connections (cannot be eavesdropped), although they are not
anonymous.
Guides:
source
Setting up Tor Bridge on Debian VPS via SSH
That is very simple.
echo "deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org sid main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list
gpg --keyserver keys.gnupg.net --recv 886DDD89
gpg --export A3C4F0F979CAA22CDBA8F512EE8CBC9E886DDD89 | sudo apt-key add -
apt-get update
apt-get install lynx tor torsocks deb.torproject.org-keyring
Then check if it works:
usewithtor lynx http://check.torproject.org/
Now let's configure it for relay: just open the torrc file, and
edit Relay config.
nano /etc/tor/torrc
Good luck. More info at: https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian.html.en
source
Connect OpenVPN client through Tor's SOCKS port (Linux)
You might use virtual machine, e.g. some virtual container, like
jail or lxc.
Thereafter, setup virtual interface on the host, bind Tor's
socks5 port to this interface.
In the vm, start openvpn daemon with host's virtual interface
socks-proxy address, and socks5 port.
Now your vpn goes through Tor.
description
tor is a
connection-oriented anonymizing communication service.
Users choose a source-routed path through a set of
nodes, and negotiate a "virtual circuit" through
the network, in which each node knows its predecessor and
successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down the circuit
is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
the downstream node.
Basically
tor provides a distributed network of servers
("onion routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams
— web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc — around the
routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the
stream.
client options
The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
SocksPort, TransPort, DNSPort, or
NATDPort is non-zero):
AllowInvalidNodes
entry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous|...
If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the
directory authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning
that it’s not recommended you use them for entry or exit
positions in your circuits. You can opt to use them in some
circuit positions, though. The default is "middle,rendezvous",
and other choices are not advised.
ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1
This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include
relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If
ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be
included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being
seized or observed, so they are not normally included. Also note
that relatively few clients turn off this option, so using these
relays might make your client stand out. (Default: 1)
Bridge [transport] IP:ORPort
[fingerprint]
When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
"IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If
"fingerprint" is provided (using the same format as for
DirServer), we will verify that the relay running at that
location has the right fingerprint. We also use fingerprint to
look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if it’s
provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
If "transport" is provided, and matches to a
ClientTransportPlugin line, we use that pluggable transports
proxy to transfer data to the bridge.
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0|1
If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled.
(Default: 1)
CircuitBuildTimeout NUM
Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the
circuit isn’t open in that time, give up on it. If
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this value serves as the initial
value to use before a timeout is learned. If
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
(Default: 60 seconds)
CircuitIdleTimeout NUM
If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM
seconds, then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely
idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
connections. Also, if we end up making a circuit that is not
useful for exiting any of the requests we’re receiving, it won’t
forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1 hour)
CircuitStreamTimeout NUM
If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule
for how many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and
try a new circuit. If your network is particularly slow, you
might want to set this to a number like 60. (Default: 0)
ClientOnly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a relay or
serve directory requests. This config option is mostly
meaningless: we added it back when we were considering having Tor
clients auto-promote themselves to being relays if they were
stable and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor
is a client unless ORPort or DirPort are configured. (Default: 0)
ExcludeNodes node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and
address patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit.
(Example: ExcludeNodes SlowServer,
ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is
allowed to override in order to keep working. For example, if you
try to connect to a hidden service, but you have excluded all of
the hidden service’s introduction points, Tor will connect to one
of them anyway. If you do not want this behavior, set the
StrictNodes option (documented below).
Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node
selection options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor
builds for you. Clients can still build circuits through you to
any node. Controllers can tell Tor to build circuits through any
node.
ExcludeExitNodes node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and
address patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit
node---that is, a node that delivers traffic for you outside the
Tor network. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is
automatically considered to be part of this list too. See also
the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below.
ExitNodes node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and
address patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a node
that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network.
Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too
many exit nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade
functionality. For example, if none of the exits you list allows
traffic on port 80 or 443, you won’t be able to browse the web.
Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic
outside of the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits
(such as those used to connect to hidden services, those that do
directory fetches, those used for relay reachability self-tests,
and so on) that end at a non-exit node. To keep a node from being
used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes.
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in
both ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
The .exit address notation, if enabled via AllowDotExit,
overrides this option.
EntryNodes node,node,...
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, and country codes of
nodes to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. Normal
circuits include all circuits except for direct connections to
directory servers. The Bridge option overrides this option; if
you have configured bridges and UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are
used as your entry nodes.
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in
both EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
StrictNodes 0|1
If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes
option as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you
generate, even if doing so will break functionality for you. If
StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the
ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the side of avoiding
unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it
is okay to use an excluded node when it is necessary to
perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to a hidden
service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit
request, upload directory information, or download directory
information. (Default: 0)
FascistFirewall 0|1
If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on
ports that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see
FirewallPorts). This will allow you to run Tor as a client
behind a firewall with restrictive policies, but will not allow
you to run as a server behind such a firewall. If you prefer more
fine-grained control, use ReachableAddresses instead.
FirewallPorts PORTS
A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only
used when FascistFirewall is set. This option is
deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
ReachableAddresses
ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your
firewall allows you to connect to. The format is as for the
addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood
unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For example,
'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
*:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything
inside net 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts
connections to port 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.)
ReachableDirAddresses
ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports.
Tor will obey these restrictions when fetching directory
information, using standard HTTP GET requests. If not set
explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used.
If HTTPProxy is set then these connections will go through
that proxy.
ReachableORAddresses
ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]...
Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports.
Tor will obey these restrictions when connecting to Onion
Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not set explicitly then the value of
ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPSProxy is set
then these connections will go through that proxy.
The separation between ReachableORAddresses and
ReachableDirAddresses is only interesting when you are
connecting through proxies (see HTTPProxy and
HTTPSProxy). Most proxies limit TLS connections (which Tor
uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some limit
HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
information) to port 80.
HidServAuth onion-address auth-cookie
[service-name]
Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses
contain 16 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth
cookies contain 22 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is
only used for internal purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This
option may be used multiple times for different hidden services.
If a hidden service uses authorization and this option is not
set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden services can be
configured to require authorization using the
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option.
CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout 0|1
If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden service client circuits
which have not moved closer to connecting to their destination
hidden service when their internal state has not changed for the
duration of the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such
circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish
connecting to their destination hidden services. In either case,
another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits for the same
destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0)
CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout 0|1
If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden-service-side rendezvous
circuits after the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such
circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish
connecting to their destinations. In either case, another
rendezvous circuit for the same destination client will be
launched. (Default: 0)
LongLivedPorts PORTS
A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running
connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for
streams that use these ports will contain only high-uptime nodes,
to reduce the chance that a node will go down before the stream
is finished. Note that the list is also honored for circuits
(both client and service side) involving hidden services whose
virtual port is in this list. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050,
5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)
MapAddress address newaddress
When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will transform to
newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want
connections to www.example.com to exit via torserver
(where torserver is the nickname of the server), use
"MapAddress www.example.com www.example.com.torserver.exit". If
the value is prefixed with a "*.", matches an entire domain. For
example, if you always want connections to example.com and any if
its subdomains to exit via torserver (where
torserver is the nickname of the server), use "MapAddress
*.example.com *.example.com.torserver.exit". (Note the leading
"*." in each part of the directive.) You can also redirect all
subdomains of a domain to a single address. For example,
"MapAddress *.example.com www.example.com".
NOTES:
1. When evaluating MapAddress expressions Tor stops when it hits
the most recently added expression that matches the requested
address. So if you have the following in your torrc,
www.torproject.org will map to 1.1.1.1:
MapAddress www.torproject.org 2.2.2.2
MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
2. Tor evaluates the MapAddress configuration until it finds no
matches. So if you have the following in your torrc,
www.torproject.org will map to 2.2.2.2:
MapAddress 1.1.1.1 2.2.2.2
MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
3. The following MapAddress expression is invalid (and will be
ignored) because you cannot map from a specific address to a
wildcard address:
MapAddress www.torproject.org *.torproject.org.torserver.exit
4. Using a wildcard to match only part of a string (as in
*ample.com) is also invalid.
NewCircuitPeriod NUM
Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit.
(Default: 30 seconds)
MaxCircuitDirtiness NUM
Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM
seconds ago, but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is
too old. For hidden services, this applies to the last
time a circuit was used, not the first. (Default: 10 minutes)
MaxClientCircuitsPending NUM
Do not allow more than NUM circuits to be pending at a time for
handling client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun
constructing it, but it has not yet been completely constructed.
(Default: 32)
NodeFamily node,node,...
The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or
nicknames, constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered
servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit.
Defining a NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn’t list
the family itself (with MyFamily). This option can be used
multiple times. In addition to nodes, you can also list IP
address and ranges and country codes in {curly braces}.
EnforceDistinctSubnets 0|1
If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too
close" on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too
close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
SOCKSPort [address:]port|auto
[isolation flags]
Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking
applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow
application connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor
pick a port for you. This directive can be specified multiple
times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 9050)
The isolation flags arguments give Tor rules for which
streams received on this SOCKSPort are allowed to share circuits
with one another. Recognized isolation flags are:
IsolateClientAddr
Don’t share circuits with streams from a different client
address. (On by default and strongly recommended; you can disable
it with NoIsolateClientAddr.)
IsolateSOCKSAuth
Don’t share circuits with streams for which different SOCKS
authentication was provided. (On by default; you can disable it
with NoIsolateSOCKSAuth.)
IsolateClientProtocol
Don’t share circuits with streams using a different protocol.
(SOCKS 4, SOCKS 5, TransPort connections, NATDPort connections,
and DNSPort requests are all considered to be different
protocols.)
IsolateDestPort
Don’t share circuits with streams targetting a different
destination port.
IsolateDestAddr
Don’t share circuits with streams targetting a different
destination address.
SessionGroup=INT
If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow streams on
this port to share circuits with streams from every other port
with the same session group. (By default, streams received on
different SOCKSPorts, TransPorts, etc are always isolated from
one another. This option overrides that behavior.)
SOCKSListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for connections from
Socks-speaking applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also
specify a port (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be
specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
(DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple
SOCKSPort entries, and provide addresses for SOCKSPort entries,
so SOCKSListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward
compatibility, SOCKSListenAddress is only allowed when SOCKSPort
is just a port number.)
SocksPolicy policy,policy,...
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect
to the SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same
form as exit policies below.
SocksTimeout NUM
Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM
seconds unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we
fail it. (Default: 2 minutes)
TokenBucketRefillInterval NUM
[msec|second]
Set the refill interval of Tor’s token bucket to NUM
milliseconds. NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive. Note
that the configured bandwidth limits are still expressed in bytes
per second: this option only affects the frequency with which Tor
checks to see whether previously exhausted connections may read
again. (Default: 100 msec)
TrackHostExits host,.domain,...
For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse
the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a
'.', it is treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the
values is just a '.', it means match everything. This option is
useful if you frequently connect to sites that will expire all
your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if your IP address
changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of
making it more clear that a given history is associated with a
single user. However, most people who would wish to observe this
will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means
anyhow.
TrackHostExitsExpire NUM
Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The
default is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
UpdateBridgesFromAuthority 0|1
When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge
descriptors from the configured bridge authorities when feasible.
It will fall back to a direct request if the authority responds
with a 404. (Default: 0)
UseBridges 0|1
When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in
the "Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both entry
guards and directory guards. (Default: 0)
UseEntryGuards 0|1
If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry
servers, and try to stick with them. This is desirable because
constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary
who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths.
(Default: 1)
NumEntryGuards NUM
If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM
routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3)
SafeSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application
connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones
that only provide an IP address, meaning the application is doing
a DNS resolve first. Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5
when not doing remote DNS. (Default: 0)
TestSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log
entry for each connection to the Socks port indicating whether
the request used a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see
above entry on SafeSocks). This helps to determine whether an
application using Tor is possibly leaking DNS requests. (Default:
0)
WarnUnsafeSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will warn whenever a request is
received that only contains an IP address instead of a hostname.
Allowing applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a
bad idea and can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1)
VirtualAddrNetwork Address/bits
When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a
MAPADDRESS command from the controller or the
AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor picks an unassigned address
from this range. (Default: 127.192.0.0/10)
When providing proxy server service to a network of computers
using a tool like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to
"10.192.0.0/10" or "172.16.0.0/12". The default
VirtualAddrNetwork address range on a properly configured
machine will route to the loopback interface. For local use, no
change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.
AllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1
When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing
illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to
resolve URLs and so on. (Default: 0)
AllowDotExit 0|1
If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the
SocksPort/TransPort/NATDPort into "www.google.com" addresses that
exit from the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking
websites and exit relays can use it to manipulate your path
selection. (Default: 0)
FastFirstHopPK 0|1
When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for
the first hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe
since we have already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to
establish forward-secure keys. Turning this option off makes
circuit building slower.
Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first
hop if it’s operating as a relay, and it will never use the
public key step if it doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first
hop. (Default: 1)
TransPort [address:]port|auto
[isolation flags]
Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set
this to 0 if you don’t want to allow transparent proxy
connections. Set the port to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to
multiple addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an explanation of
isolation flags.
TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as
BSDs' pf or Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a
transparent proxy for a network, you’ll want to examine and
change VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You’ll also
want to set the TransListenAddress option for the network you’d
like to proxy. (Default: 0)
TransListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections.
(Default: 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent
proxy server to an entire network. (DEPRECATED: As of
0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple TransPort entries, and
provide addresses for TransPort entries, so TransListenAddress no
longer has a purpose. For backward compatibility,
TransListenAddress is only allowed when TransPort is just a port
number.)
NATDPort [address:]port|auto
[isolation flags]
Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of
ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD
protocol. Use 0 if you don’t want to allow NATD connections. Set
the port to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This
directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation
flags.
This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort.
(Default: 0)
NATDListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (DEPRECATED:
As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple NATDPort entries,
and provide addresses for NATDPort entries, so NATDListenAddress
no longer has a purpose. For backward compatibility,
NATDListenAddress is only allowed when NATDPort is just a port
number.)
AutomapHostsOnResolve 0|1
When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an
address that ends with one of the suffixes in
AutomapHostsSuffixes, we map an unused virtual address to
that address, and return the new virtual address. This is handy
for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that resolve
an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0)
AutomapHostsSuffixes
SUFFIX,SUFFIX,...
A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with
AutomapHostsOnResolve. The "." suffix is equivalent to
"all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
DNSPort [address:]port|auto
[isolation flags]
If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and
resolve them anonymously. Set the port to "auto" to have Tor pick
a port for you. This directive can be specified multiple times to
bind to multiple addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an
explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0)
DNSListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (DEPRECATED:
As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple DNSPort entries,
and provide addresses for DNSPort entries, so DNSListenAddress no
longer has a purpose. For backward compatibility,
DNSListenAddress is only allowed when DNSPort is just a port
number.)
ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0|1
If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS
answer that tells it that an address resolves to an internal
address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1). This option prevents
certain browser-based attacks; don’t turn it off unless you know
what you’re doing. (Default: 1)
ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0|1
If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an
internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) unless a exit
node is specifically requested (for example, via a .exit
hostname, or a controller request). (Default: 1)
DownloadExtraInfo 0|1
If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These
documents contain information about servers other than the
information in their regular router descriptors. Tor does not use
this information for anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave
this option turned off. (Default: 0)
FallbackNetworkstatusFile FILENAME
If Tor doesn’t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out
using this one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can
still use it to learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn’t need
to put load on the authorities. (Default: None)
WarnPlaintextPorts port,port,...
Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an
anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is
designed to alert users to services that risk sending passwords
in the clear. (Default: 23,109,110,143)
RejectPlaintextPorts port,port,...
Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port
uses, Tor will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default:
None)
AllowSingleHopCircuits 0|1
When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use
relays that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on
to build one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)
OptimisticData 0|1|auto
When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node that
supports the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to
the exit node without waiting for the exit node to report whether
the connection succeeded. This can save a round-trip time for
protocols like HTTP where the client talks first. If
OptimisticData is set to auto, Tor will look at the
UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus. (Default: auto)
Tor2webMode 0|1
When this option is set, Tor connects to hidden services
non-anonymously. This option also disables client
connections to non-hidden-service hostnames through Tor. It
must only be used when running a tor2web Hidden Service
web proxy. To enable this option the compile time flag
--enable-tor2webmode must be specified. (Default: 0)
UseMicrodescriptors 0|1|auto
Microdescriptors are a smaller version of the information that
Tor needs in order to build its circuits. Using microdescriptors
makes Tor clients download less directory information, thus
saving bandwidth. Directory caches need to fetch regular
descriptors and microdescriptors, so this option doesn’t save any
bandwidth for them. If this option is set to "auto" (recommended)
then it is on for all clients that do not set
FetchUselessDescriptors. (Default: auto)
PathBiasCircThreshold NUM
PathBiasNoticeRate NUM
PathBiasDisableRate NUM
PathBiasScaleThreshold NUM
PathBiasScaleFactor NUM
These options override the default behavior of Tor’s
(currently experimental) path bias detection algorithm. To
try to find broken or misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for
nodes where more than a certain fraction of circuits through that
node fail after the first hop. The PathBiasCircThreshold option
controls how many circuits we need to build through a guard
before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate and
PathBiasDisableRate options control what fraction of circuits
must succeed through a guard so we won’t warn about it or disable
it, respectively. When we have seen more than
PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a guard, we divide our
observations by PathBiasScaleFactor, so that new observations
don’t get swamped by old ones.
By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these
options, Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus
consensus document. If no defaults are available there, these
options default to 20, .70, 0.0, 200, and 4 respectively.
command-line options
-h, -help
Display a short help message and exit.
-f FILE
Specify a new configuration file to contain further Tor
configuration options. (Default: $HOME/.torrc, or /etc/tor/torrc
if that file is not found)
--defaults-torrc FILE
Specify a file in which to find default values for Tor options.
The contents of this file are overridden by those in the regular
configuration file, and by those on the command line. (Default:
/etc/tor/torrc-defaults.)
--hash-password
Generates a hashed password for control port access.
--list-fingerprint
Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
--verify-config
Verify the configuration file is valid.
--service install [--options command-line
options]
Install an instance of Tor as a Windows service, with the
provided command-line options. Current instructions can be found
at
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice
--service remove|start|stop
Remove, start, or stop a configured Tor Windows service.
--nt-service
Used internally to implement a Windows service.
--list-torrc-options
List all valid options.
--version
Display Tor version and exit.
--quiet|--hush
Override the default console log. By default, Tor starts out
logging messages at level "notice" and higher to the console. It
stops doing so after it parses its configuration, if the
configuration tells it to log anywhere else. You can override
this behavior with the --hush option, which tells Tor to
only send warnings and errors to the console, or with the
--quiet option, which tells Tor not to log to the console
at all.
Other options can be specified on the command-line in the format
"--option value", in the format "option value", or in a
configuration file. For instance, you can tell Tor to start
listening for SOCKS connections on port 9999 by passing
--SOCKSPort 9999 or SOCKSPort 9999 to it on the command line, or
by putting "SOCKSPort 9999" in the configuration file. You will
need to quote options with spaces in them: if you want Tor to log
all debugging messages to debug.log, you will probably need to
say --Log debug file debug.log.
Options on the command line override those in configuration
files. See the next section for more information.
directory authority server options
RecommendedVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently
believed to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and
nodes which pull down the directory learn whether they need to
upgrade. This option can appear multiple times: the values from
multiple lines are spliced together. When this is set then
VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.
RecommendedClientVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently
believed to be safe for clients to use. This information is
included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the
value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set
then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.
RecommendedServerVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently
believed to be safe for servers to use. This information is
included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the
value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set
then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.
ConsensusParams STRING
STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will
include in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.
DirAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary
"Address" elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP
address or is a private IP address, it will reject the router
descriptor. (Default: 0)
AuthDirBadDir AddressPattern...
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for
servers that will be listed as bad directories in any network
status document this authority publishes, if
AuthDirListBadDirs is set.
AuthDirBadExit AddressPattern...
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for
servers that will be listed as bad exits in any network status
document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadExits
is set.
AuthDirInvalid AddressPattern...
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for
servers that will never be listed as "valid" in any network
status document that this authority publishes.
AuthDirReject AddressPattern...
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for
servers that will never be listed at all in any network status
document that this authority publishes, or accepted as an OR
address in any descriptor submitted for publication by this
authority.
AuthDirBadDirCCs CC,...
AuthDirBadExitCCs CC,...
AuthDirInvalidCCs CC,...
AuthDirRejectCCs CC,...
Authoritative directories only. These options contain a
comma-separated list of country codes such that any server in one
of those country codes will be marked as a bad directory/bad
exit/invalid for use, or rejected entirely.
AuthDirListBadDirs 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has
some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory
caches. (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list
non-functioning directories as bad; otherwise, you are
effectively voting in favor of every declared directory.)
AuthDirListBadExits 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has
some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do
not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits
as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every
declared exit as an exit.)
AuthDirRejectUnlisted 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server
rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren’t explicitly
listed in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if
we get hit with a Sybil attack. (Default: 0)
AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr NUM
Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers
that we will list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this
to "0" for "no limit". (Default: 2)
AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr NUM
Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr,
but applies to addresses shared with directory authorities.
(Default: 5)
AuthDirFastGuarantee N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the Fast
flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or more.
(Default: 100 KB)
AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised
capacity or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth
requirement for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KB)
BridgePassword Password
If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge
authority to serve all requested bridge information. Used by the
(only partially implemented) "bridge community" design, where a
community of bridge relay operators all use an alternate bridge
directory authority, and their target user audience can
periodically fetch the list of available community bridges to
stay up-to-date. (Default: not set)
V3AuthVotingInterval N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s
preferred voting interval. Note that voting will actually
happen at an interval chosen by consensus from all the
authorities' preferred intervals. This time SHOULD divide evenly
into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
V3AuthVoteDelay N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s
preferred delay between publishing its vote and assuming it has
all the votes from all the other authorities. Note that the
actual time used is not the server’s preferred time, but the
consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes)
V3AuthDistDelay N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s
preferred delay between publishing its consensus and signature
and assuming it has all the signatures from all the other
authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server’s
preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5
minutes)
V3AuthNIntervalsValid NUM
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of
VotingIntervals for which each consensus should be valid for.
Choosing high numbers increases network partitioning risks;
choosing low numbers increases directory traffic. Note that the
actual number of intervals used is not the server’s preferred
number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at least 2.
(Default: 3)
V3BandwidthsFile FILENAME
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
bandwidth-authority generated file storing information on relays'
measured bandwidth capacities. (Default: unset)
V3AuthUseLegacyKey 0|1
If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only
with its own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and
certificate with a different identity. This feature is used to
migrate directory authority keys in the event of a compromise.
(Default: 0)
RephistTrackTime N
seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks
Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and
history, that fine-grained information about nodes can be
discarded when it hasn’t changed for a given amount of time.
(Default: 24 hours)
VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor votes on whether to accept
relays as hidden service directories. (Default: 1)
directory server options
The following options are useful only for directory servers (that
is, if DirPort is non-zero):
AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates
its own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the
clients. Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted
directory, you probably do not want to set this option. Please
coordinate with the other admins at
tor-ops[:at:]torproject[:dot:]org if you think you should be a
directory.
DirPortFrontPage FILENAME
When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it
as "/" on the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a
disclaimer without needing to set up a separate webserver.
There’s a sample disclaimer in contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.
V1AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 1 directory
and running-routers documents (for legacy Tor clients up to
0.1.0.x).
V2AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 2 network
statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in
doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running
0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
V3AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 3 network
statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in
doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at
least 0.2.0.x).
VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which
versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to the published
directory. Each version 1 authority is automatically a versioning
authority; version 2 authorities provide this service optionally.
See RecommendedVersions, RecommendedClientVersions,
and RecommendedServerVersions.
NamingAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it
has opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will
include these opinions in its published network-status pages, by
listing servers with the flag "Named" if a correct binding
between that nickname and fingerprint has been registered with
the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to accept or publish
descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See
approved-routers in the FILES section below.
HSAuthoritativeDir 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor also accepts and serves v0
hidden service descriptors, which are produced and used by Tor
0.2.1.x and older. (Default: 0)
HidServDirectoryV2 0|1
When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because
clients connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
BridgeAuthoritativeDir 0|1
When this option is set in addition to
AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor accepts and serves router
descriptors, but it caches and serves the main networkstatus
documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 N
seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks
Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as
such by authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours)
DirPort [address:]PORT|auto
[flags]
If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on
this port. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This
option can occur more than once. (Default: 0)
The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort.
DirListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a
port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort.
(Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified multiple times
to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
This option is deprecated; you can get the same behavior with
DirPort now
that it supports NoAdvertise and explicit addresses.
DirPolicy policy,policy,...
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect
to the directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit
policies above.
FetchV2Networkstatus 0|1
If set, we try to fetch the (obsolete, unused) version 2 network
status consensus documents from the directory authorities. No
currently supported Tor version uses them. (Default: 0)
files
/etc/tor/torrc
The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
/var/lib/tor/
The tor process stores keys and other data here.
DataDirectory/cached-status/
The most recently downloaded network status document for each
authority. Each file holds one such document; the filenames are
the hexadecimal identity key fingerprints of the directory
authorities. Mostly obsolete.
DataDirectory/cached-consensus and/or
cached-microdesc-consensus
The most recent consensus network status document we’ve
downloaded.
DataDirectory/cached-descriptors and
cached-descriptors.new
These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may
appear more than once; if so, the most recently published
descriptor is used. Lines beginning with @-signs are annotations
that contain more information about a given router. The ".new"
file is an append-only journal; when it gets too large, all
entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
DataDirectory/cached-microdescs and
cached-microdescs.new
These files hold downloaded microdescriptors. Lines beginning
with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when
it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new
cached-microdescs file.
DataDirectory/cached-routers and
cached-routers.new
Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and
cached-descriptors.new. When Tor can’t find the newer files, it
looks here instead.
DataDirectory/state
A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
the file. These include:
• The current entry guards and their status.
• The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see
below).
• When the file was last written
• What version of Tor generated the state file
• A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router
descriptors.
DataDirectory/bw_accounting
Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current
period starts and ends; how much has been read and written so far
this period). This file is obsolete, and the data is now stored
in the 'state' file as well. Only used when bandwidth accounting
is enabled.
DataDirectory/control_auth_cookie
Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can
be overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on
startup. See control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie
authentication is enabled.
DataDirectory/keys/*
Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
DataDirectory/fingerprint
Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server’s
identity key.
DataDirectory/approved-routers
Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see
NamingAuthoritativeDirectory). This file lists nickname to
identity bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint
separated by whitespace. See your fingerprint file in the
DataDirectory for an example line. If the nickname is
!reject then descriptors from the given identity
(fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
!invalid then descriptors are accepted but marked in the
directory as not valid, that is, not recommended.
DataDirectory/router-stability
Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements
for router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a
good idea of how to set their Stable flags.
HiddenServiceDirectory/hostname
The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this
hidden service. If the hidden service is restricted to authorized
clients only, this file also contains authorization data for all
clients.
HiddenServiceDirectory/private_key
The private key for this hidden service.
HiddenServiceDirectory/client_keys
Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible
by authorized clients.
general options
BandwidthRate N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on
this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the
average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want
to run a relay in the public network, this needs to be at the
very least 30 KB (that is, 30720 bytes). (Default: 5 MB)
BandwidthBurst N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to
the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
MaxAdvertisedBandwidth N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth
for our BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the
number of clients who ask to build circuits through them (since
this is proportional to advertised bandwidth rate) can thus
reduce the CPU demands on their server without impacting network
performance.
RelayBandwidthRate N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming
bandwidth usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the
specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
bandwidth usage to that same value. Relayed traffic currently is
calculated to include answers to directory requests, but that may
change in future versions. (Default: 0)
RelayBandwidthBurst N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the
burst) for _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each
direction. (Default: 0)
PerConnBWRate N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a
non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a
network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay
will use that value. (Default: 0)
PerConnBWBurst N
bytes|KB|MB|GB
If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a
non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a
network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay
will use that value. (Default: 0)
ClientTransportPlugin transport socks4|socks5
IP:PORT, ClientTransportPlugin
transport exec path-to-binary [options]
In its first form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge
line, the Tor client forwards its traffic to a SOCKS-speaking
proxy on "IP:PORT". It’s the duty of that proxy to properly
forward the traffic to the bridge.
In its second form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge
line, the Tor client launches the pluggable transport proxy
executable in path-to-binary using options as its
command-line options, and forwards its traffic to it. It’s the
duty of that proxy to properly forward the traffic to the bridge.
ServerTransportPlugin transport exec
path-to-binary [options]
The Tor relay launches the pluggable transport proxy in
path-to-binary using options as its command-line
options, and expects to receive proxied client traffic from it.
ConnLimit NUM
The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to
the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as
many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by
"ulimit -H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor
will refuse to start.
You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on
Windows since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
DisableNetwork 0|1
When this option is set, we don’t listen for or accept any
connections other than controller connections, and we don’t make
any outbound connections. Controllers sometimes use this option
to avoid using the network until Tor is fully configured.
(Default: 0)
ConstrainedSockets 0|1
If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers
for all sockets to the size specified in
ConstrainedSockSize. This is useful for virtual servers
and other environments where system level TCP buffers may be
limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you encounter the
"Error creating network socket: No buffer space available"
message, you are likely experiencing this problem.
The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer
pool for the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or
equivalent facility; this configuration option is a
second-resort.
The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are
scarce. The cached directory requests consume additional sockets
which exacerbates the problem.
You should not enable this feature unless you encounter
the "no buffer space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers
affects window size for the TCP stream and will reduce throughput
in proportion to round trip time on long paths. (Default: 0)
ConstrainedSockSize N bytes|KB
When ConstrainedSockets is enabled the receive and
transmit buffers for all sockets will be set to this limit. Must
be a value between 2048 and 262144, in 1024 byte increments.
Default of 8192 is recommended.
ControlPort PORT|auto
If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control
Protocol (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also
specify one or more of HashedControlPassword or
CookieAuthentication, setting this option will cause Tor
to allow any process on the local host to control it. (Setting
both authentication methods means either method is sufficient to
authenticate to Tor.) This option is required for many Tor
controllers; most use the value of 9051. Set it to "auto" to have
Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0)
ControlListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a
port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in
ControlPort. We strongly recommend that you leave this alone
unless you know what you’re doing, since giving attackers access
to your control listener is really dangerous. This directive can
be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
(Default: 127.0.0.1)
ControlSocket Path
Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather
than a TCP socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
ControlSocketsGroupWritable 0|1
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to
read and write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option
is set to 1, make the control socket readable and writable by the
default GID. (Default: 0)
HashedControlPassword hashed_password
Allow connections on the control port if they present the
password whose one-way hash is hashed_password. You can
compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
password". You can provide several acceptable passwords by
using more than one HashedControlPassword line.
CookieAuthentication 0|1
If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port
when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
"control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data
directory. This authentication method should only be used on
systems with good filesystem security. (Default: 0)
CookieAuthFile Path
If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 0|1|Groupname
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to
read the cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie
file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by
other groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this
for some reason.] (Default: 0)
ControlPortWriteToFile Path
If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it
opens to this address. Usable by controllers to learn the actual
control port when ControlPort is set to "auto".
ControlPortFileGroupReadable 0|1
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to
read the control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the
control port file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
DataDirectory DIR
Store working data in DIR (Default: /var/lib/tor)
DirServer [nickname] [flags]
address:port fingerprint
Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option
can be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
servers. Flags are separated by spaces, and determine what kind
of an authority this directory is. By default, every authority is
authoritative for current ("v2")-style directories, unless the
"no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is provided, Tor will
use this server as an authority for old-style (v1) directories as
well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will use this
server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs"
flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is
not set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge
authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set. If a flag
"orport=port" is given, Tor will use the given port when
opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a flag
"v3ident=fp" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory
authority whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint
fp.
If no dirserver line is given, Tor will use the default
directory servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a
private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If you
use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you
won’t believe the same authorities they do.
DynamicDHGroups 0|1
If this option is set to 1, when running as a server, generate
our own Diffie-Hellman group instead of using the one from
Apache’s mod_ssl. This option may help circumvent censorship
based on static Diffie-Hellman parameters. (Default: 0)
AlternateDirAuthority [nickname] [flags]
address:port fingerprint
AlternateHSAuthority [nickname] [flags]
address:port fingerprint
AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags]
address:port fingerprint
These options behave as DirServer, but they replace fewer of the
default directory authorities. Using AlternateDirAuthority
replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but leaves the
default hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in
place. Similarly, AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default
hidden service authorities, but not the directory or bridge
authorities; and AlternateBridgeAuthority replaces the default
bridge authority, but leaves the directory and hidden service
authorities alone.
DisableAllSwap 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future
memory pages, so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X
and Solaris are currently not supported. We believe that this
feature works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it
should work on *BSD systems (untested). This option requires that
you start your Tor as root, and you should use the User
option to properly reduce Tor’s privileges. (Default: 0)
DisableDebuggerAttachment 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging
attachment attempts by other processes. It has no impact for
users who wish to attach if they have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they
are root. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux
distributions, and that it may also work on *BSD systems
(untested). Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such as Ubuntu have the
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable it as an
attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by
default. This feature will attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for
Tor specifically - it will not attempt to alter the system wide
ptrace scope as it may not even exist. If you wish to attach to
Tor with a debugger such as gdb or strace you will want to set
this to 0 for the duration of your debugging. Normal users should
leave it on. Disabling this option while Tor is running is
prohibited. (Default: 1)
FetchDirInfoEarly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like
other directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal
criteria for fetching early. Normal users should leave it off.
(Default: 0)
FetchDirInfoExtraEarly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other
directory caches. It will attempt to download directory
information closer to the start of the consensus period. Normal
users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
FetchHidServDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors
from the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if
you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidden service fetches
for you. (Default: 1)
FetchServerDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or
server descriptors from the directory servers. This option is
only useful if you’re using a Tor controller that handles
directory fetches for you. (Default: 1)
FetchUselessDescriptors 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from
the authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid
fetching useless descriptors, for example for routers that are
not running. This option is useful if you’re using the
contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to
certain addresses. (Default: 0)
HTTPProxy host[:port]
Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port
(or host:80 if port is not specified), rather than connecting
directly to any directory servers.
HTTPProxyAuthenticator username:password
If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP
proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only
form of HTTP proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to
submit a patch if you want it to support others.
HTTPSProxy host[:port]
Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port
(or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather
than connecting directly to servers. You may want to set
FascistFirewall to restrict the set of ports you might try
to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only allows connecting to
certain ports.
HTTPSProxyAuthenticator username:password
If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS
proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only
form of HTTPS proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free
to submit a patch if you want it to support others.
Socks4Proxy host[:port]
Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at
host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
Socks5Proxy host[:port]
Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at
host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
Socks5ProxyUsername username
Socks5ProxyPassword password
If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and
password in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password
must be between 1 and 255 characters.
KeepalivePeriod NUM
To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding
keepalive cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in
use. If the connection has no open circuits, it will instead be
closed after NUM seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity]
stderr|stdout|syslog
Send all messages between minSeverity and
maxSeverity to the standard output stream, the standard
error stream, or to the system log. (The "syslog" value is only
supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are debug, info,
notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to
an attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is
given, all messages of that level or higher will be sent to the
listed destination.
Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] file
FILENAME
As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log"
option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
level.
Log
[domain,...]minSeverity[-maxSeverity]
... file FILENAME
Log
[domain,...]minSeverity[-maxSeverity]
... stderr|stdout|syslog
As above, but select messages by range of log severity and
by a set of "logging domains". Each logging domain corresponds to
an area of functionality inside Tor. You can specify any number
of severity ranges for a single log statement, each of them
prefixed by a comma-separated list of logging domains. You can
prefix a domain with ~ to indicate negation, and use * to
indicate "all domains". If you specify a severity range without a
list of domains, it matches all domains.
This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging
one or two of Tor’s subsystems at a time.
The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net,
config, fs, protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug,
dir, dirserv, or, edge, acct, hist, and handshake. Domain names
are case-insensitive.
For example, "Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout"
sends to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all
info-and-higher messages from domains other than networking and
memory management, and all messages of severity notice or higher.
LogMessageDomains 0|1
If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message. Every
log message currently has at least one domain; most currently
have exactly one. This doesn’t affect controller log messages.
(Default: 0)
OutboundBindAddress IP
Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address
specified. This is only useful when you have multiple network
interfaces, and you want all of Tor’s outgoing connections to use
a single one. This setting will be ignored for connections to the
loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
PidFile FILE
On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
FILE.
ProtocolWarnings 0|1
If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other
parties not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are
logged with severity 'info'. (Default: 0)
RunAsDaemon 0|1
If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has
no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service
command-line option. (Default: 0)
LogTimeGranularity NUM
Set the resolution of timestamps in Tor’s logs to NUM
milliseconds. NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a
multiple of 1 second. Note that this option only controls the
granularity written by Tor to a file or console log. Tor does not
(for example) "batch up" log messages to affect times logged by a
controller, times attached to syslog messages, or the mtime
fields on log files. (Default: 1 second)
SafeLogging 0|1|relay
Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages
(e.g. addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed].
This way logs can still be useful, but they don’t leave behind
personally identifying information about what sites a user might
have visited.
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing,
if it is set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are
replaced. If it is set to relay, all log messages generated when
acting as a relay are sanitized, but all messages generated when
acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)
User UID
On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary
group.
HardwareAccel 0|1
If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware
acceleration when available. (Default: 0)
AccelName NAME
When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load
the dynamic engine of this name. This must be used for any
dynamic hardware engine. Names can be verified with the openssl
engine command.
AccelDir DIR
Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and
the engine implementation library resides somewhere other than
the OpenSSL default.
AvoidDiskWrites 0|1
If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would
otherwise. This is useful when running on flash memory or other
media that support only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
TunnelDirConns 0|1
If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we
will build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via
its ORPort. (Default: 1)
PreferTunneledDirConns 0|1
If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support
tunneled directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)
CircuitPriorityHalflife NUM1
If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for
choosing which circuit’s cell to deliver or relay next. When the
value is 0, we round-robin between the active circuits on a
connection, delivering one cell from each in turn. When the value
is positive, we prefer delivering cells from whichever connection
has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are weighted
exponentially according to the supplied CircuitPriorityHalflife
value (in seconds). If this option is not set at all, we use the
behavior recommended in the current consensus networkstatus. This
is an advanced option; you generally shouldn’t have to mess with
it. (Default: not set)
DisableIOCP 0|1
If Tor was built to use the Libevent’s "bufferevents" networking
code and you’re running on Windows, setting this option to 1 will
tell Libevent not to use the Windows IOCP networking API.
(Default: 1)
UserspaceIOCPBuffers 0|1
If IOCP is enabled (see DisableIOCP above), setting this option
to 1 will tell Tor to disable kernel-space TCP buffers, in order
to avoid needless copy operations and try not to run out of
non-paged RAM. This feature is experimental; don’t use it yet
unless you’re eager to help tracking down bugs. (Default: 0)
_UseFilteringSSLBufferevents 0|1
Tells Tor to do its SSL communication using a chain of
bufferevents: one for SSL and one for networking. This option has
no effect if bufferevents are disabled (in which case it can’t
turn on), or if IOCP bufferevents are enabled (in which case it
can’t turn off). This option is useful for debugging only; most
users shouldn’t touch it. (Default: 0)
CountPrivateBandwidth 0|1
If this option is set, then Tor’s rate-limiting applies not only
to remote connections, but also to connections to private
addresses like 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1. This is mostly useful for
debugging rate-limiting. (Default: 0)
hidden service options
The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
HiddenServiceDir DIRECTORY
Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden
service must have a separate directory. You may use this option
multiple times to specify multiple services. DIRECTORY must be an
existing directory.
HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT [TARGET]
Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may
use this option multiple times; each time applies to the service
using the most recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option
maps the virtual port to the same port on 127.0.0.1 over TCP. You
may override the target port, address, or both by specifying a
target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have multiple
lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that
VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at
random.
PublishHidServDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but
it won’t advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option
is only useful if you’re using a Tor controller that handles
hidserv publishing for you. (Default: 1)
HiddenServiceVersion
version,version,...
A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for
the hidden service. Currently, only version 2 is supported.
(Default: 2)
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type
client-name,client-name,...
If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized
clients only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a
general-purpose authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less
scalable protocol that also hides service activity from
unauthorized clients. Only clients that are listed here are
authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names are 1
to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not
accessible for clients without authorization any more. Generated
authorization data can be found in the hostname file. Clients
need to put this authorization data in their configuration file
using HidServAuth.
RendPostPeriod N
seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any
rendezvous service descriptors to the directory servers. This
information is also uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1
hour)
server options
The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if
ORPort is non-zero):
Address address
The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server
(e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will
guess your IP address. This IP address is the one used to tell
clients and other servers where to find your Tor server; it
doesn’t affect the IP that your Tor client binds to. To bind to a
different address, use the *ListenAddress and OutboundBindAddress
options.
AllowSingleHopExits 0|1
This option controls whether clients can use this server as a
single hop proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an
exit even if it is the only hop in the circuit. Note that most
clients will refuse to use servers that set this option, since
most clients have ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0)
AssumeReachable 0|1
This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set
to 1, don’t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server
descriptor immediately. If AuthoritativeDirectory is also
set, this option instructs the dirserver to bypass remote
reachability testing too and list all connected servers as
running.
BridgeRelay 0|1
Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying
connections from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly
causes Tor to publish a server descriptor to the bridge database,
rather than publishing a relay descriptor to the public directory
authorities.
ContactInfo email_address
Administrative contact information for server. This line might
get picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the
fact that it’s an email address.
ExitPolicy policy,policy,...
Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
"accept|reject
ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]". If /MASK is
omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead
of giving a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the
universe (0.0.0.0/0). PORT can be a single port number, an
interval of ports "FROM_PORT-TO_PORT", or "*". If
PORT is omitted, that means "*".
For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*"
would reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu,
and accept anything else.
To specify all internal and link-local networks (including
0.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16,
10.0.0.0/8, and 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias
instead of an address. These addresses are rejected by default
(at the beginning of your exit policy), along with your public IP
address, unless you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option
to 0. For example, once you’ve done that, you could allow HTTP to
127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks
with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that may also
allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more
details about internal and reserved IP address space.
This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have
to put it all on one line.
Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins.
If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit
policy with either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise,
you’re _augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. The
default exit policy is:
reject *:25
reject *:119
reject *:135-139
reject *:445
reject *:563
reject *:1214
reject *:4661-4666
reject *:6346-6429
reject *:6699
reject *:6881-6999
accept *:*
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0|1
Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public
IP address, at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry
on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)
MaxOnionsPending NUM
If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for
decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
MyFamily node,node,...
Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a
group or organization identical or similar to that of the other
servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames.
When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family',
Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server
only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn’t
need to list itself, but it won’t hurt.) Do not list any bridge
relay as it would compromise its concealment.
Nickname name
Set the server’s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1
and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters
[a-zA-Z0-9].
NumCPUs num
How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and
other parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will
try to detect how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can’t
tell. (Default: 0)
ORPort [address:]PORT|auto
[flags]
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients
and servers. This option is required to be a Tor server. Set it
to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not run
an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default:
0)
Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort:
**NoAdvertise**::
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway.
This
can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to
(for
example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere
else.
**NoListen**::
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway.
This
can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's
port
forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.
**IPv4Only**::
If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an
IPv6
address, only listen to the IPv4 address.
**IPv6Only**::
If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an
IPv6
address, only listen to the IPv6 address.
For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually
exclusive, and
IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
ORListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor
clients and servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port
rather than the one specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This
directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
addresses/ports.
This option is deprecated; you can get the same behavior with
ORPort now
that it supports NoAdvertise and explicit addresses.
PortForwarding 0|1
Attempt to automatically forward the DirPort and ORPort on a NAT
router connecting this Tor server to the Internet. If set, Tor
will try both NAT-PMP (common on Apple routers) and UPnP (common
on routers from other manufacturers). (Default: 0)
PortForwardingHelper filename|pathname
If PortForwarding is set, use this executable to configure the
forwarding. If set to a filename, the system path will be
searched for the executable. If set to a path, only the specified
path will be executed. (Default: tor-fw-helper)
PublishServerDescriptor
0|1|v1|v2|v3|bridge,...
This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when
acting as a relay. You can choose multiple arguments, separated
by commas.
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its descriptors
to any directories. (This is useful if you’re testing out your
server, or if you’re using a Tor controller that handles
directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its
descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which
means "if running as a server, publish the appropriate
descriptors to the authorities".
ShutdownWaitLength NUM
When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin shutting down:
we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After
NUM seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit
immedi- ately. (Default: 30 seconds)
HeartbeatPeriod N
minutes|hours|days|weeks
Log a heartbeat message every HeartbeatPeriod seconds.
This is a log level info message, designed to let you know
your Tor server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings
this to 0 will disable the heartbeat. (Default: 6 hours)
AccountingMax N
bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB
Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given
accounting period, or receive more than that number in the
period. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server
could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB and continue running. It
will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GB. When the
number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections
and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will
hibernate until some time in the next accounting period. To
prevent all servers from waking at the same time, Tor will also
wait until a random point in each period before waking up. If you
have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation is preferable to
setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a
collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is
more useful than a set of slow servers that are always
"available".
AccountingStart day|week|month [day]
HH:MM
Specify how long accounting periods last. If month is
given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM on
the dayth day of one month to the same day and time of the
next. (The day must be between 1 and 28.) If week is
given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM of
the dayth day of one week to the same day and time of the
next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If
day is given, each accounting period runs from the time
HH:MM each day to the same time on the next day. All times
are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Default: "month 1 0:00")
RefuseUnknownExits 0|1|auto
Prevent nodes that don’t appear in the consensus from exiting
using this relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit
attempts from such nodes; if it’s 0, we never do, and if the
option is "auto", then we do whatever the authorities suggest in
the consensus. (Default: auto)
ServerDNSResolvConfFile filename
Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
filename. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
"resolv.conf" file (7). This option, like all other
ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server
does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to use the system DNS
configuration.)
ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 0|1
If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are
problems parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to
nameservers. Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the
system nameservers until it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1)
ServerDNSSearchDomains 0|1
If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local
search domain. For example, if this system is configured to
believe it is in "example.com", and a client tries to connect to
"www", the client will be connected to "www.example.com". This
option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf
of clients. (Default: 0)
ServerDNSDetectHijacking 0|1
When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to
determine whether our local nameservers have been configured to
hijack failing DNS requests (usually to an advertising site). If
they are, we will attempt to correct this. This option only
affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
(Default: 1)
ServerDNSTestAddresses
address,address,...
When we’re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these
valid addresses aren’t getting redirected. If they are,
then our DNS is completely useless, and we’ll reset our exit
policy to "reject :". This option only affects name
lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default:
"www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org")
ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1
When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve
hostnames containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather
than sending them to an exit node to be resolved. This helps trap
accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. This option only
affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
(Default: 0)
BridgeRecordUsageByCountry 0|1
When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and
we have GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how
many client addresses have contacted it so that it can help the
bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to it.
(Default: 1)
ServerDNSRandomizeCase 0|1
When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character
randomly in outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case
matches in DNS replies. This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist
some types of DNS poisoning attack. For more information, see
"Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through 0x20-Bit Encoding".
This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
GeoIPFile filename
A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with
BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
CellStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean
time that cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours.
(Default: 0)
DirReqStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on
the number and response time of network status requests to disk
every 24 hours. (Default: 1)
EntryStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number
of directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. (Default:
0)
ExitPortStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number
of relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24
hours. (Default: 0)
ConnDirectionStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the
bidirectional use of connections to disk every 24 hours.
(Default: 0)
ExtraInfoStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered
statistics in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the
directory authorities. (Default: 1)
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor routers allow EXTEND request to
localhost, RFC1918 addresses, and so on. This can create security
issues; you should probably leave it off. (Default: 0)
signals
Tor catches the following signals:
SIGTERM
Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and
exit.
SIGINT
Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a
controlled slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30
seconds before exiting. (The delay can be configured with the
ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
SIGHUP
The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including
closing and reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper
processes if applicable.
SIGUSR1
Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and
throughput.
SIGUSR2
Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old
loglevels by sending a SIGHUP.
SIGCHLD
Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has
exited, so it can clean up.
SIGPIPE
Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
SIGXFSZ
If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores
it.
testing network options
The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
TestingTorNetwork 0|1
If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration
options below, so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor
network. May only be set if non-default set of DirServers is set.
Cannot be unset while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
AssumeReachable 1
AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
CountPrivateBandwidth 1
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 1
V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds
TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval N
minutes|hours
Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before
the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay N
minutes|hours
Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting
interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing
this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5
minutes)
TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay N
minutes|hours
Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting
interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing
this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5
minutes)
TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability N
minutes|hours
After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether
routers are Running until this much time has passed. Changing
this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30
minutes)
TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime N
minutes|hours
Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches
after this time. Changing this requires that
TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 10 minutes)
the configuration file format
All configuration options in a configuration are written on a
single line by default. They take the form of an option name and
a value, or an option name and a quoted value (option value or
option "value"). Anything after a # character is treated as a
comment. Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters
are allowed inside quoted values. To split one configuration
entry into multiple lines, use a single backslash character (\)
before the end of the line. Comments can be used in such
multiline entries, but they must start at the beginning of a
line.
By default, an option on the command line overrides an option
found in the configuration file, and an option in a configuration
file overrides one in the defaults file.
This rule is simple for options that take a single value, but it
can become complicated for options that are allowed to occur more
than once: if you specify four SOCKSPorts in your configuration
file, and one more SOCKSPort on the command line, the option on
the command line will replace all of the SOCKSPorts in the
configuration file. If this isn’t what you want, prefix the
option name with a plus sign, and it will be appended to the
previous set of options instead.
Alternatively, you might want to remove every instance of an
option in the configuration file, and not replace it at all: you
might want to say on the command line that you want no SOCKSPorts
at all. To do that, prefix the option name with a forward slash.
bugs
Plenty,
probably. Tor is still in development. Please report
them.
see also
privoxy,
tsocks, torify
https://www.torproject.org/
authors
Roger
Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at
alum.mit.edu].